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Abstract 
I utilize a differentiable dynamical system á la Lotka-Voletrra and explain monetary and fiscal in-
teraction in a supranational monetary union. The paper demonstrates an applied mathematical 
approach that provides useful insights about the interaction mechanisms in theoretical economics 
in general and a monetary union in particular. I find that a common central bank is necessary but 
not sufficient to tackle the new interaction problems in a supranational monetary union, such as 
the free-riding behaviour of fiscal policies. Moreover, I show that supranational institutions, rules 
or laws are essential to mitigate violations of decentralized fiscal policies. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper studies the theoretical implications of monetary and fiscal interaction in a monetary union. This is an 
urgent and interesting topic, especially since the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010. I utilize an approach 
from applied mathematics in order to model the economic interactions in a supranational monetary union. A dif- 
ferentiable dynamical system, similar to a Lotka-Volterra model, turns out to be well suited for studying this pro- 
blem. Overall, my mathematical model is literally interdisciplinary and links two, up to now, hardly unconnect- 
ed areas: the theory of differential equations and monetary economics. 
It is not surprising that there are relatively few economic models that capture the sophisticated subspace of 
monetary-fiscal interaction. This has to do with the complexity and dynamics in this field of economics. So far, 
it is common practice in the economics literature to apply a game theoretic approach to study this question [1]- 
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[4]. However, these models lack of dynamics and fail to incorporate the complexity of monetary-fiscal interac- 
tion. Consequently, a new applied mathematical model in theoretical economics needs to be both tractable and 
comprehensible for mathematical economists. I build such a model based on differential equations. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the model and discusses some propo- 
sitions. I show the existence, stability and solution of the model as well as the economic implications in general. 
Finally, Section 3 concludes the paper. 
2. The Model 
2.1. Economic Model 
The model’s framework consists of three interacting institutions. The first institution is the European Central 
Bank (ECB) that is centralized in a monetary union. The primary objective of monetary policy is to maintain 
price-stability according to Article 105 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The 
ECB, however, interacts with the decentralized fiscal policies, the second institution in the model. Both insti- 
tutions, in particular the central bank, determine the common interest rate. At the moment, there are 18 member 
countries and thus fiscal policies in the euro area. The main difference between monetary and fiscal policy is 
that the fiscal authorities retain full sovereignty at the national level. The third institution is supranational law or 
governance, such as the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and other 
legal constraints [5]. The supranational rules and laws mainly limit the decentralized fiscal policies and support 
the goals of the centralized monetary policy. The major problem in a monetary union is known as fiscal policy 
free-riding and moral hazard [6]-[8]. Consequently, the model consists of three interaction channels: 
a) Monetary policy interacts with fiscal policy. The decision about the level of public deficits and debts have an 
impact on the common central bank.  
b) Fiscal policy in one member country interacts with the other fiscal policies in the monetary union. There is 
competition about the public good “price-stability” provided by ECB. One fiscal policy can undermine the 
supranational objective and transfer the cost to all countries; i.e. through free-riding.  
c) Supranational law defines the level playing field for all institutions. These rules interact with both fiscal pol-
icies and the central bank. The main objective is the mitigation of fiscal heterogeneity as well as free-riding 
and moral hazard.  
The paper analyzes these interaction channels in a monetary union in general. I utilize a mathematical model 
that consists of differential equations. Until now, economic literature has studied these interactions mainly in 
game theoretic models [2]. The first model in this field of literature was developed by Beetsma and Uhlig [5]. 
All economic models lack of a rigorous modeling of the full interactions and the simultaneous linkages. More- 
over, the economic literature focuses on the level of nominal and real variables and it does not study the dy- 
namic processes [9]. To my knowledge, there is no paper that utilizes a mathematical model based on diffe- 
rential equations to capture these interactions in a monetary union. Given the current policy challenges in Eu- 
rope, my model offers important policy lessons. 
2.2. Applied Mathematical Model 
First of all, I model the interaction of fiscal policies and the supranational law respectively. Suppose, ( )x t  is 
the number of fiscal policies with excessive national public deficit and debt levels. Hence, ( )x t  measures the 
number of countries in violation of supranational law, i.e. the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which is a simple 
deficit and debt rule1. The dynamic yields 
( ) ( ) 00, 0 .t tx g p s x t x x′ = − × > =                              (1) 
The 0g >  represents the benefits fiscal policies obtain through debt accumulation and free-riding. Deficit 
spending induces a short-run growth stimulus and thus higher domestic GDP. But the costs of higher deficits in 
one country, i.e. higher interest rates, have to be paid by all euro area member countries. The product p s×  re- 
presents the punishment in case of violation with the supranational debt rule. According to the rule, the punish- 
ment is a fixed amount, s , of the GDP (cf. SGP). The parameter, 0p > , represents the probability of detection 
of a fiscal policy failure. Hence, the first-order differential Equation (1) has an intuitive economic interpretation. 
 
 
1The Stability and Growth (SGP) limits public deficits to 3% of GDP and debt to 60% of GDP. 
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The higher domestic benefits from deficit spending than punishment ( )0g ps− > , the greater the number of 
fiscal policies violating the supranational debt rule. However, if countries do not consolidate the public budget 
according to the supranational rule, they have to pay a sanction if it is detected. Hence, the rule should mitigate 
the number of violating countries. 
The solution of the model is ( ) ( )0e g p s tx t x − ×= . This solution reveals, again, as long as debt accumulation 
(free-riding incentive) is greater than the sanction 0g ps− > , countries prefer free-riding. Only sufficiently 
high sanctions, s , or a high detection probability, p , mitigate the problem. Unfortunately, the enforcement of 
European law is rather weak and thus, p , is low in reality [10] [11]. Moreover, the sanction scheme, s , is ra- 
ther limited today as well2. A more comprehensive modeling of the sanction scheme is 
( ) 0 0 , 0.t t ts s x s a x s a= = + × ≥                             (2) 
The sanction payment ts  depends on a fixed rate 0s  and variable rate a . The parameter a  depends on 
the number of breaching fiscal policies, tx , and is economically a marginal propensity of sanctions. After subs- 
titution of Equation (2) in Equation (1), I obtain 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 0
d
with 0, 0 ,
d
F
t t
x t
x t p a x x t x x
t
ζ′= = − × × > =                   (3) 
where 0:
F g p sζ = − ×  is a constant. The differential Equation (3) is a so-called logistic-differential equation or 
Verhulst-Model. I obtain the solution of that differential equation through integration 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
00 0
0
0
d 1 1d d
1 ln ln .
t x t x t
F FFx x
F
F F
x pat x
x pa xp a x x
x t pa x
pa
x pa x t
τ
ζ ζζ
ζ
ζ ζ
 
= = = + − ×− × ×  
    − ×
= + ×    − ×     
∫ ∫ ∫
                  (4) 
Finally, I solve the equation for ( )x t , 
( )
( )
0
0 0
.
e
F
F
F t
x
x t
pa x pa x ζ
ζ
ζ −
×
=
× + − ×
                        (5) 
This solution has the following boundaries for t →∞ : 
( ) ( )
if 0,
0 if 0.
F F
F
pa
x t
ζ ζ
ζ
 >→ 
<
                            (6) 
If supranational law is fully effective, i.e. the detection probability p  and the fixed sanction 0s  are high, 
then the number of breaching countries converge to zero. However, if 0Fζ > , i.e. 0 0g p s− × > , the number 
of breaching countries ( )x t  convergence to ( )F paζ . Obviously, only fully effective supranational law mi- 
nimizes the number of breaching countries. In other words, the smaller Fζ  and the larger pa , the smaller the 
number of countries violating the rules. The term ( )F paζ  could be interpreted as a natural intake capacity of 
breaching countries in a monetary union. 
Next, I study monetary policy. The main instrument of a common central bank is the interest rate level ( )y t . 
Importantly, in a monetary union the key interest rate is an average rate that should be appropriate for almost all 
member countries. But high domestic public deficits and debts indirectly affect (increase) the common interest 
rate. Thus, there exists a fiscal policy spill-over to monetary policy through the interest rate channel. For sim- 
plicity, let me first abstract from the spill-over mechanism. I model the interest rate dynamics ( )y t , again, 
through a differential equation 
( ) ( )1 0, 0, 0 ,Mt t ty d y y t y yζ −′ = − × > =                             (7) 
where ty′  is the first derivative and economically the rate of change. In addition, 0d ≥  measures the target 
commitment of the central bank, i.e. low inflation. The greater d , the higher the interest rates and the lower 
 
 
2The sanction is a linear function of GDP with a minimum payment 0s  and a maximum of 0.25 percent of GDP according to EU-Regula- 
tion No. 1467/97. 
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inflation. If d →∞  the common central bank fully commits to the primary objective of price stability3. Hence, 
in this case the parameter Mζ  is dominating Equation (7). In the following, I define 1:c d −= . Finally, Mζ  
represents a fixed punishment of the common central bank for the free-riding incentives of fiscal policies in a 
monetary union. Obviously, as already explained, a comprehensive model considers the fiscal spill-over me- 
chanism, too. Thus, Mζ  depends on the number of breaching fiscal policies, such as 
( ) 1 2 1 2with , 0,M M Mt tx xζ ζ ζ ζ ζ= − + ≥                             (8) 
where 1
Mζ  represents the central bank reaction to publicly sound fiscal policies. This group of countries lower 
the common interest rate. And 2
Mζ  depicts the effect of breaching (unsound) fiscal policies. These countries 
endanger inflation in the whole monetary union. Thus, the common central bank has to increase the common 
rate for all member countries. Consequently, the benefits of domestic deficit spending pass through a higher 
interest rate to all member countries. Furthermore, I generalize Fζ . The incentive of free-riding is dependent 
on the interest rate level ty : 
( ) 3 4 3 4with , 0,F F Ft ty yζ ζ ζ ζ ζ= − ≥                             (9) 
where 3
Fζ  represents the free-rider incentives in a monetary union [4] and 4
Fζ  measures the disciplining 
effect of higher interest rates on the free-riding behaviour. In the next section, I study the complete fiscal-mo- 
netary interaction. 
2.3. General Mathematical Model 
Analyzing the complete dynamics of the fiscal-monetary-law interaction reveals new insights about the ne- 
cessary and sufficient conditions for a long-run stable and sustainable monetary union. Using Equations (3) and 
(7) together with conditions (8) and (9), yields the following system: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
3 4 0
1 2 0
0 0
0 0
F F
t t t t
M M
t t t t
x y pa x x t x x
y x c y y t y y
ζ ζ
ζ ζ
′ = − × − × > =
′ = − + × − × > =
                    (10) 
Interestingly, this system of two differential equations is similar to a so-called “Lotka-Volterra” model, de- 
veloped by Alfred James Lotka (1880-1949) and Vito Volterra (1860-1949), and is an useful concept in appli- 
ed mathematics [12]. To understand how the fiscal-monetary-law model evolves over the time, I first simplify 
the equations and assume 0a c= = . This system has two possible solutions ( )1 1,x y ′  and ( )2 2,x y ′ : 
1 2 1 2
1 2 3 4
0
and .
0
M M
F F
x x
y y
ζ ζ
ζ ζ
     
= =      
      
 
The asymptotic stability or instability of the model can be studied. I define the function ( ),F x y  and cal- 
culate the eigenvalues. The function is, 
( )
( )
( )
3 4
1 2
, , 0.
F F
t t
t tM M
t t
y x
F x y x y
x y
ζ ζ
ζ ζ
 −
 = ≥
 − + 
                    (11) 
The first derivative for the two solutions yields 
( )
1
4
23 31
2 41 3
2
4
0
0
0,0 , , .
0
0
M
F
MF FM
M FM F
M
F
F F
ζ
ζ
ζζ ζζ
ζ ζζ ζ
ζ
ζ
 
− 
     ′ ′= ∧ =     −      
 
 
Consequently, the eigenvalues of ( )0,0F ′  are computed by ( ) ( )( )3 1 1 2det 0,0 0F MF Iλ ζ λ ζ λ′ − = − − − = .  
This implies 1 3
Fλ ζ=  and 2 1
Mλ ζ= − . From an economic point of view 0iζ >  i∀ , and thus 1 0λ >  and 
 
 
3According to article 105 TFEU “... the primary objective of the... [European Central Bank]... is price stability.” The US-Federal Reserve 
Bank, however, has a dual mandate which means a lower d. 
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2 0λ < . The system is instable, if 1Re 0λ <  and 2Re 0λ > . Hence, ( )1 0;0P  is an instable equilibrium. The  
instability can also be seen from ( ) 3 1det 0,0 0F MF ζ ζ′ = − < . To determine the eigenvalue for 31
2 4
,
FM
M FF
ζζ
ζ ζ
 
′ 
 
, I  
solve the following problem 
3 31 1
1 2 2 4 1 2 3 1
2 4 4 2
det , 0.
F FM M
M F F M
M F F MF I
ζ ζζ ζ
λ λ λ ζ ζ λ λ ζ ζ
ζ ζ ζ ζ
 
′ − = × + × = × + × = 
 
           (12) 
The second solution of the model ( )2 1 2 3 4;M M F FP ζ ζ ζ ζ  is instable again, due to 1Re 0λ <  and 2Re 0λ >   
or vice versa. But if 1 2λ λ= , I obtain 3 1
F Mλ ζ ζ= − × . Hence, there is the possibility of complex eigenvalues.  
This implies no real solution. Finally, I describe the solution behaviour of the model near a point 
( )1 2 3 4;M M F Fζ ζ ζ ζ , if the eigenvalues are complex. First, I rewrite the system as 
( )
( )
3 4
1 2
d
d d .
dd
d
F F
t tt
M M
t t t
x
y xxx t
yy y x y
t
ζ ζ
ζ ζ
− ×′
= = =
′ − + ×
                            (13) 
Next, I integrate and obtain, 
31 1 2 3 4
2 4ln d d ln ,
FM
M M F F
M Ft t
t t t t
t t
x y
x x x y y y
x y
ζζ ζ ζ ζ ζζ ζ α
− + × − ×   − + × = = = − × −
   ∫ ∫       (14) 
where Rα ∈  is an integration constant. Consequently, all solutions ( ) ( )( ),x t y t ′  satisfy the implicit solution: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 3 2 4ln ln 0.
M F
M Fx t y t x t y t tζ ζ ζ ζ α   + − − = ∀ ≥      
                  (15) 
The integration constant α  can be calculated from the initial condition ( )0 0,x y ′ :  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 3 2 4ln 0 ln 0 0 0 .
M F
M Fx y x yζ ζα ζ ζ   = + − × − ×      
 I suggest that ( ) ( )( ),x t y t ′  satisfy a closed-form  
solution in the environment ( ),δ  around the point ( )2 2,x y ′ , 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]312 2
2 4
sin and cos ,
FM
M Fx t t y t t
ζζ
ω δ ω
ζ ζ
= + = +                     (16) 
where 0> , 1δ   and 0ω > . For 0t =  and trivial aggregation it results: 
( ) ( )311 3 1 3
2 4
ln ln 0 .
FM
M F M F
M F
ζζ
α ζ ζ ζ ζ δ δ
ζ ζ
  
= + − − + →  
   
               (17) 
The second-order Taylor approximation of the solution ( ) ( )( ),x t y t ′  in the environment of 2 1 2M Mx ζ ζ=  
and 2 3 4
F Fy ζ ζ=  yields ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 3 2 4ln lnM F M Fx t y t x t y tζ ζ ζ ζ× + × − × − ×       , which is equivalent to: 
( )
2
2 231 2
1 2 3 4
2 4 1
2
2 2 3 34
1 2 3 4
3
2 2
2 2 231 2 4
1 3 1 3
2 4 1 3
ln sin ln cos sin
2
cos sin cos
2
ln ln sin cos
2 2
FM M
M M F F
M F M
F
M M M F F
F
FM M F
M F M F
M F M F
t t t
t t t
t
ζζ ζ
ζ ζ ω ζ ζ δ ω ω
ζ ζ ζ
ζ
δ ω ζ ζ ω ζ ζ δ ω δ
ζ
ζζ ζ ζ
ζ ζ ζ ζ ω δ
ζ ζ ζ ζ
  
+ + + +  
   
+ − − − − + +
  
= + − − + +  
   
 
  
 ( )
( )
2 3 3
2
,
.
tω δ
α
+ +
= +
 
 
     (18) 
This shows that that the specific solution solves the model for ( ) ( )( ),x t y t ′  until an error term of order 
( )2  . Moreover, the ‘trajectories’ ( ) ( ){ }, : 0x t y t t ≥  are approximative ellipses around the point ( )2 2,x y ′ . 
The model reveals an interesting economic interpretation for 0a c= = : the model has an equilibrium with a 
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certain number of fiscal policies breaching the supranational deficit and debt rule as long as the supranational 
law and central bank are ineffective and do not intervene in case of fiscal policy violations. 
Finally, I study the full model of Equation (10) with 0a c≠ ≠ . Again, I calculate the solutions and prove the 
stability of the associated equilibria. I obtain 
( )
( )
( )
3 4
1 2
, , 0.
F F
t t t
t t t tM M
t t t
y ap x x
F x y x y
x c y y
ζ ζ
ζ ζ
 − × − ×
 = ≥
 − + × − × 
                    (19) 
The general model has four solutions: 
( )31 2 3
31 2 1
00
,
0 0
F
M
xx x ap
yy y c
ζ
ζ
        
= ∧ = ∧ =          −          
 
and ( )4 4,x y ′  is the solution of the following linear system 
44 3
42 1
.
F F
M M
xap
yc
ζ ζ
ζ ζ
    
=    −     
 
Applying Cramer’s rule, I obtain 
4 3 4 1
4 2 4 3 2 1
1 .
F F M
M F F M M
x c
y apc ap
ζ ζ ζ
ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ
 × + × 
=    + × − ×   
 
For later computation purposes, I define 3 4 1:
F F MA cζ ζ ζ= × + ×  and 3 2 1:
F M MB apζ ζ ζ= × − × . The stability 
of the solutions are computed via the function ( ),F x y . The derivative yields 
( ) 3 4 4
2 1 2
2
, .
2
F F F
t t
t t M M M
t t t
pax x
F x y
y x cy
ζ ζ ζ
ζ ζ ζ
 − − −
′ =  
− + − 
                    (20) 
The point ( ) ( )1 1, 0,0x y ′ ′=  is non-stationary because Re 0λ > . The second solution ( )2 2,x y ′  is non- 
stationary because , 0t tx y  . The point ( )3 3,x y ′  is unstable, if ( )1 2 3M M F apζ ζ ζ<  or asymptotically stable,  
if ( )1 2 3M M F apζ ζ ζ> . The point ( )4 4,x y ′  has positive values, i.e. , 0t tx y ≥ , for ( )1 2 3M M F apζ ζ ζ< . The  
eigenvalues of Equation (20) for ( )4 4;P x y  are: 
( ) ( ) ( )21,2 2 21 1 ,2 4
M MaA cB aA cB ac ABλ ζ ζ= − + ± + − +  
where , 0A B >  and they are defined as above. As long as 1,2Re 0λ < , the point ( )4 4;P x y  is asymptotically 
stable. That means ( ) ( )( ) ( )4 4, ,x t y t x y′ ′→  for t →∞ . Economically, it implies a certain number of fiscal 
policies violating the supranational deficit and debt rule. The following expressions summarize the results, for 
t →∞ : 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
3 31
2
3 3 4 1 3 2 11
2 2 4 2 4
: and 0
: and .
F FM
M
F F F M F M MM
M M F M F
x t y t
ap ap
c ap
x t y t
ap apc apc
ζ ζζ
ζ
ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζζ
ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ
> → →
+ −
< → →
+ +
           (21) 
The first constellation becomes a reality if free-rider incentives are small ( )3 0Fζ →  and the number of dis- 
ciplined fiscal policies are great ( )1Mζ → ∞ . The next proposition reveals an answer to the following question: 
Is a supranational central bank sufficient to constrain the number of fiscal policies violating the supranational 
debt rule in a monetary union? 
Proposition 1 The number of fiscal policies ( )x t  in violation with a debt rule is always positive in a mo- 
netary union, as long as 3
Fζ , p , and a  are non-zero.  
The proof of this proposition follows from Equation (21). First, the constellation ( )1 2 3M M F apζ ζ ζ>  is eco-  
nomically not realistic because the common interest rate converges for t  to infinity, to zero ( )( )0y t → . Any- 
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way, even in this case the number of breaching fiscal policies converge to a positive fixed ratio. For the second 
constellation ( )x t  and ( )y t  is always positive, too. This is surprising because it demonstrates that the 
common cental bank is ineffective in mitigating the free-riding incentives through higher interest rates. 
Consequently, effective supranational governance, that prevents debt accumulation of fiscal policies, is essential 
in a monetary union. Proposition 1 reveals that supranational governance is only effective if both the detection 
probability p  and the marginal sanction fee a  is high. In this case ( )x t  and ( )y t  declines because the 
free-riding incentives are less attractive. Unfortunately, the existing European fiscal and economic governance 
scheme is neither effective nor rigorously enforced. Consequently, the current sanction procedure in the Euro- 
pean Monetary Union (EMU) has a low detection probability and a weak enforcement. Moreover, there are too 
many exceptions as well as loopholes, and the whole governance is under flawed partisan influence. Overall, 
this explains the importance of sustainable public finances and an efficient fiscal and economic governance 
scheme in a monetary union. Otherwise, a monetary union is doomed to fail. The final proposition discusses the 
sensitivity of the general model. 
Proposition 2 For 1 2 3
M M Fpaζ ζ ζ< , the number of fiscal policies ( )x t  violating supranational law and the 
common interest rate ( )y t , except for (iii), is low, if   
a) the detection probability, p , is high;  
b) the marginal sanction fee, a , is high;  
c) central bank commitment, d, is high (i.e. c is low). 
Proof: The proof follows by direct differentiation of ( )x t  and ( )y t : 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
3 4 1
2
2 4
1 2 4 3 2 1
2
2 4
0
0.
F F M
M F
M M F F M M
M F
cx t
p apc
a apc ap pcy t
p apc
ζ ζ ζ
ζ ζ
ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ
ζ ζ
+∂
= − <
∂ +
− + − −∂
= <
∂ +
 
Part (ii), follows by differentiation in respect to a , 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
3 4 1
2
2 4
1 2 4 3 2 1
2
2 4
0
0.
F F M
M F
M M F F M M
M F
pc cx t
a apc
p apc ap pcy t
a apc
ζ ζ ζ
ζ ζ
ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ
ζ ζ
+∂
= − <
∂ +
− + − −∂
= <
∂ +
 
Part (iii) is shown by  
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
4 3 2 1 3 2 1
2 2
2 4 2 4
0 0.
F F M M F M M
M F M F
ap pa apx t y t
c capc apc
ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ
ζ ζ ζ ζ
− −∂ ∂
= > = − <
∂ ∂+ +
 
3. Conclusion 
This paper explains the unique fiscal-monetary-law interaction in a supranational monetary union. I conclude the 
paper by discussing some generalizations and by touching on some issues that the model did not address. First, 
the argument is much more general than initially considered. The results reveal new insights about the interac- 
tion of the key institutions in a monetary union. The model demonstrates that without effective laws and fiscal 
and economic governance, a monetary union is doomed to fail. Consequently, the fiscal and economic govern- 
ance scheme, together with the common cental bank, plays an important role in a monetary union. Second, the 
model is well designed to analyze the institutional drawbacks and interaction relationships in the EMU. The re- 
sult suggests a tough sanction scheme for unsound fiscal policies. Only this can mitigate the potential benefits of 
free-riding. The major omission of the model is an endogenous economic-political element that considers for in- 
stance strategic policy decisions or veto power. Furthermore, an empirical investigation of the proposition is also 
an important study object in future research. Moreover, I do not consider the fact that small and weak agents ty- 
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pically pay more attention to supranational law than powerful agents do. 
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